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Attorneys for Plaintiff Mark Rubenstein

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No.: '13CV0106 MMAKSC

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

MARK RUBENSTEIN, an individual,

Plaintiff,

VS.

INC., S.D.A.R., corporation an business as SAN DIEGO AUTO RECOVERY, and TREVOR ARLIE PRATT and DOES 1-10.

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Mark RUBINSTEIN, alleges the following:

INTRODUCTION

1. PLAINTIFF entered into a loan agreement with Trading Financial Credit LLC ("TRADEFINANCIAL"), which he paid promptly by telephone for four months, until a fire at TRADEFINANCIAL triggered the need for a new temporary method of payment. After a verbal agreement to new terms of payment, PLAINTIFF was surprised to discover PRATT towing service at his home with the intention to tow off his vehicle. Upon confronting PRATT that he and TRADFINANCIAL had reached an agreement regarding

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

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payment, he approached the vehicle and was physically pushed aside by a PRATT employee. After a physical altercation and scuffle, PLAINTIFF managed to enter the vehicle and drive away, while the PRATT employee was beating on the windows of the vehicle and threatening to return for PLAINTIFF and vehicle. This confrontation left PLAINTIFF in such a state of mental anguish, that he was emotionally distressed each time any car drove near his property thereafter, thinking it could be PRATT.

- 2. Defendant's wrongful conduct caused Mr. RUBINSTEIN actual damages, in the form of serious and severe physical and emotional distress, including not but limited to emotional distress, diarrhea, change in appetite, anxiety, tension, aggravation, headaches, nausea, loss of sleep, frustration, crying spells, hand tremors, and shaking limbs.
 - 3. According to 15 U.S.C. §1692:
 - (a) There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.
 - (b) Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.
 - (c) Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts.
 - (d) Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate commerce and through means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where abusive debt collection practices are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate commerce.
 - (e) It is the purpose of this title to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.

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PARTIES

- 4. MARK RUBINSTEIN ("Plaintiff") is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a natural person residing in the State of California, County of San Diego. Plaintiff is a consumer as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1692a(3).
- 5. S.D.A.R., INC., (SDAR) doing business as, SAN DIEGO AUTO RECOVERY is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a corporation which lawfully conducts business in the State of California. SDAR is licensed with the California Bureau of Security and Investigative Services as a repossessor, license 598. SDAR's conduct is regulated by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act codified under Title 15 USC 1692 *et seq.* And Defendant is subject to 15 U.S.C. 1692f(6).
- 6. TREVOR ARLIE PRATT (PRATT) is an employee of SDAR and is licensed as an employee of a repossessor agency, license number 510677. PRATT's conduct is regulated by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act codified under Title 15 USC 1692 *et seq.* Defendant is subject to 15 U.S.C. 1692f(6).
- 7. Defendant and defendants refer to all defendants, name and unnamed, as plaintiff alleges each are jointly and severally liable for the conduct alleged herein.
- 8. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of defendants DOES 1-50 inclusive, are unknown to plaintiff who, therefore, sues said defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to show their true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that each of said defendants is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings, and proximately caused the injuries and damages, hereinafter alleged.
- 9. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief, alleges that each of the Defendants, fictitious or named herein, are the principals, agents or employees of the other Defendants and that, all acts of said agents and employees were ratified by their principals, and/or that Defendants negligently hired or otherwise

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engaged the services of each other.

10. Plaintiff will file an amended complaint if the true names and capacities of other now unknown defendants, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise become known to plaintiff.

JURISDICTION

- 11. Jurisdiction of this court arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for supplemental state claims.
- 12. This action arises out of the defendants' violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA"), along with supplemental state claims.
 - 13. Since defendants do business within California, there is personal jurisdiction.

VENUE

- 14. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
- 15. At all times relevant, the defendants conducted business within the State of California.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 16. Plaintiff took out an auto-title loan with TRADING FINANCIAL. The loan was for personal, family or household purposes. Prior to October 15, 2012, the loan had always been paid by telephone.
- 17. Prior to October of 2012, RUBINSTEIN knew of no other way to process payments other than by telephone.
- 18. On or about early October 2012, RUBINSTEIN called TRADING FINANCIAL to make his October loan payment, but he received no answer. Eager to meet his financial obligations, RUBINSTEIN continued to call TRADING FINANCIAL but was still unable to reach anyone by phone.
- 19.On or about October 15, 2012, RUBINSTEIN sent an email to TRADING FINANCIAL stating:

 I have been trying to reach you to make a payment. Please call me 619-988-***. (Phone number redacted for privacy)

20.On or about October 19, 2012, RUBINSTEIN sent an email to TRADING FINANCIAL stating:

I have been trying to make a payment for 2 weeks and can not reach anyone at your office. I call the 1 800 number but know one answers and I have tried calling back the another [sic] number left on my voicemail and it rings busy all the time. Can you please call me back. I want to pay by check over the phone again.

- 21. On or about November 6, 2012 RUBINSTEIN visited, in person, "PAYDAY YOUR WAY", which is the San Diego business office where RUBINSTEIN originally signed the TRADING FINANCAL loan agreement and told PAYDAY YOUR WAY that he was having trouble reaching someone by telephone. At this point, he was informed that there was a fire at the Los Angeles TRADING FINANCIAL office.
- 22.On or about November 6, 2012 RUBINSTEIN finally reached TRADING FINANICAL by telephone at 12:44 PM (213-201-2100) and he told TRADING FINANCIAL that he, RUBINSTEIN, wanted to process a payment. TRADING FINANCIAL told him that he had to process the payment by MONEYGRAM because they were not able to process telephone payments at that time.
- 23. RUBINSTEIN told TRADING FINANICAL that he would process the payment by MONEYGRAM, but that it could not be done that day, but rather, the payment would be processed on November 9th, 2012. TRADING FINANICAL said that was acceptable and the call was mutually terminated.
- 24. On or about the night of November 6, 2012 and in the early morning hours of November 7, 2012, RUBINSTEIN and his roommate JESSE HALLETT were at their home with HALLETT's girlfriend, Melisa.
- 25. RUBINSTEIN and HALLETT were in the kitchen talking, when RUBINSTEIN noticed bright lights emanating through the window of the kitchen and heard the backup

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alarm of a vehicle. He could see there was activity concerning a tow truck in front of his home. Since RUBINSTEIN's vehicle was parked directly in front of his house, RUBINSTEIN immediately became concerned the driver of the tow truck was attempting to repossess his vehicle.

- 26. The tow truck was being driven by PRATT.
- 27. RUBINSTEIN and HALLET immediately left their home and ran towards the tow truck. RUBINSTEIN and HALLET noticed that the tow truck's stinger was on the ground but not facing nor touching RUBINSTEIN's vehicle. RUBINSTEIN shouted at PRATT that he had an agreement with TRADEFINANCIAL to pay the loan by Friday via MONEYGRAM, at which point, PRATT became immediately aggressive and told RUBINSTEIN that he was taking the vehicle no matter what.
- 28. PRATT then swung the stinger using the control panel of the tow truck towards RUBINSTEIN and HALLET and the vehicle which almost hit HALLET in the legs. Both RUBINSTEIN and HALLET were fearful that they would be injured by the stinger. HALLET, who was closer to the stinger, kicked it away from the vehicle and himself.
- 29. PRATT, who was previously standing by the tow truck controls, repositioned himself between RUBINSTEIN's vehicle and where RUBINSTEIN and HALLET were standing, which was next to RUBINSTEIN's driver door. PRATT was blocking the entrance into the vehicle's driver door. RUBINSTEIN demanded that PRATT allow him to get into the vehicle and get out of his way.
- 30. HALLETT, who is a former tow truck driver, told PRATT to calm down and informed PRATT that since he has not hooked up the vehicle, he was not permitted to take it because RUBINSTEIN was revoking PRATT's right to take the vehicle and because he is causing a disturbance, i.e. a breach of the peace.
- 31.A loud verbal altercation ensued between the three parties. HALLETT told RUBINSTEIN to just get into the car and leave, because he doesn't have a right to take it since he is not hooked up to it. RUBINSTEIN did what HALLETT said and attempted

to enter the vehicle so that he could leave as to end the conflict.

32. RUBINSTEIN reached for the driver side door to open the vehicle. As RUBINSTEIN reached for the door PRATT pushed RUBINSTEIN away from the driver door and said something to the effect of "You are not getting into this fucking car". HALLETT told PRATT to move and PRATT stated "I am not moving" and leaned his body in front of the driver door so no one can enter the vehicle. HALLET responded with something to the effect of "Yes, you are" and shoved PRATT out of the way.

33. PRATT started screaming at HALLET while RUBINSTEIN regained his composure. RUBINSTEIN eventually managed to open the driver door and slide into his vehicle; however escape was not easy. RUBINSTEIN had one vehicle directly in front of him, another vehicle directly behind him, and the tow truck was to the left of RUBINSTEIN (facing the wrong way in on-coming traffic). To the right was the curb.

34. RUBINSTEIN turned on the vehicle and PRATT started yelling at RUBINSTEIN to get out of the vehicle. It took approximately 30 seconds for RUBINSTEIN to maneuver the vehicle out of the spot.

35. As RUBINSTEIN started to attempt to maneuver the vehicle, PRATT moved over to the tow truck control panel and attempted to disable the vehicle's movement by placing the tow truck stringer under the vehicle. While this was happening, PRATT and HALLETT were yelling at each other. HALLETT was screaming at PRATT to let RUBINSTEIN leave and he was creating a dangerous situation.

36. RUBINSTEIN got his cell phone out and called 9-1-1. PRATT, unable to block RUBINSTEIN, ran over to RUBINSTEIN's car and started punching RUBINSTEIN's window and screaming at RUBINSTEIN, yelling he would be returning to get RUBINSTEIN and take his car. RUBINSTEIN understood this as a threat of violence to him personally.

37. As RUBINSTEIN started to exit the spot where he was parked, the stinger that PRATT attempted to use to block RUBINSTEIN's vehicle caught the wheel of

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RUBINSTEIN's vehicle and tore off his hubcap.

- 38. RUBINSTEIN was finally able to maneuver himself free and drive away. After RUBINSTEIN was able to escape, HALLETT went inside to end the conflict. After things had time to settle down, HALLETT went outside to retrieve the hubcap. He noticed that PRATT was still waiting outside.
- 39. The 911 dispatcher stated to RUBINSTEIN that if he was no longer at the scene, the matter should be handled civilly.
- 40. While in route to his mother's house, RUBINSTEIN received a telephone call on his cellular phone from the San Diego Police Department. They instructed Mr. RUBINSTEIN to return to his house.
- 41.Mr. RUBINSTEIN returned to the house as instructed by the police, where PRATT was waiting.
- 42. HALLETT, RUBINSTEIN, and PRATT all spoke with police. PRATT spoke with police first. After the police were finished speaking with PRATT, they talked to HALLET and RUBINSTEIN. The Police told RUBINSTEIN that PRATT wanted to file battery charges. RUBINSTEIN stated if that was the case, he would also file criminal battery charges. The police said if that was the case, everyone was going to go to jail, but they would talk to PRATT to see if he wanted to do that. Moments later, the police said that no charges were going to be pressed and released everyone.
- 43. RUBINSTEIN went back into his home where he attempted to sleep. However, he started feeling nauseous and every time a car came by, he feared PRATT had returned.
 - 44. HALLETT and his girlfriend Melisa attempted to calm RUBINSTEIN.
- 45. RUBINSTEIN was not able to sleep. The next day RUBINSTEIN remained at home all day on "look out", concerned that PRATT or someone PRATT sent would return to harm him or take the vehicle. That night, RUBINSTEIN decided to go to his mom's house in order to try to get some sleep.

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46. RUBINSTEIN was so upset when he arrived that his mother was concerned he might have a heart attack. When RUBINSTEIN's mother attempted to find out what was making RUBINSTEIN so upset, he broke down and cried but would not tell his mother what had happened. RUBINSTEIN's mom remembers he was distraught and shaking and became very concerned for RUBINSTEIN's wellbeing.

- 47. RUBINSTEIN's mother gave RUBINSTEIN a dose of her prescription medication in order to help her son clam down. Only with medication RUBINSTEIN was able to sleep.
- 48. For days following the incident, RUBINSTEIN was obsessed with the incident and every time a car drove near the house, he was concerned it was PRATT returning to cause more problems. He was not able to sleep normal for a period of time following the incident. During that peroid, RUBINSTEIN remained stressed; he experienced a hard time making himself eat and suffered from diarrhea.
- 49. RUBINSTEIN was eventually able to borrow the money to pay off the loan with TRADING FINANICAL.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION – FDCPA

- 50. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference all of the paragraphs above as though fully stated herein.
- 51. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seg., including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6), for their wrongful repossession.
- 52. Defendants are debt collectors pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) and subject to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6).
 - 53. Defendants were attempting to recover property subject to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6).
- 54. Defendant used unfair and unconscionable means in an attempt to collect a debt, and breached the peace, and threatened/attempted to take non-judicial action to effect dispossession of property, despite having no present right to possession of the property, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692f(6).

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55. Plaintiff is entitled to recover statutory damages, actual damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - FALSE IMPRISONMENT

- 56. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference all of the paragraphs above as more fully stated herein.
- 57. Defendants intentionally deprived Plaintiff of the freedom of movement by use of physical barriers, force and threats of force.
 - 58. Plaintiff did not consent.
 - 59. Plaintiff was harmed.
 - 60. Defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's harm.
- 61. Defendants acted with oppression, and/or malice, and conscious disregard of the rights of others, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount according to proof and a finder of fact at trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - INVASION OF PRIVACY

- 62. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference all of the paragraphs above as though fully stated herein.
- 63. Defendants' outrageous, abusive, and malicious act constituted intrusion upon Plaintiff's seclusion.
- 64. Defendants intruded upon the solitude or seclusion, private affairs or concerns of Plaintiff.
- 65. The intrusion was substantial, and of a kind that would be highly offensive to an ordinarily reasonable person.
- 66. The intrusion caused Plaintiff to sustain injury, damage, loss or harm in the form of emotional distress and actual injury as further described herein.
- 67. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

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68. Defendants acted with oppression, and/or malice, and conscious disregard of the rights of others, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount according to proof and a finder of fact at trial.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - ASSAULT

- 69. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference all of the paragraphs above as more fully stated herein.
- 70. Defendants acted intending to cause harmful or offensive contact to Plaintiff.
- 71. Plaintiff reasonably believed that he was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner.
 - 72. Plaintiff did not consent to Defendants' conduct.
 - 73. Plaintiff was harmed.
 - 74. Defendants' conduct was a substantial factoring causing Plaintiff's harm.
- 75. Defendants acted with oppression, and/or malice, and conscious disregard of the rights of others, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount according to proof and a finder of fact at trial.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION - BATTERY

- 76. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference all of the paragraphs above as more fully stated herein.
 - 77. Defendants touched Plaintiff with the intent to harm of offend her.
 - 78. Plaintiff did not consent to the touching.
 - 79. Plaintiff was harmed and offended by Defendants' conduct.
- 80. A reasonable person in Plaintiff's situation would have been offended by the touching.
- 81. Defendants acted with oppression, and/or malice, and conscious disregard of the rights of others, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount according to proof and a finder of fact at trial.

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SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENCE

- 82. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference all of the paragraphs above as more fully stated herein.
- 83. Defendants' outrageous, abusive and intrusive acts as described herein constituted negligence.
 - 84. Defendants breached a duty imposed by law and contract.
 - 85. The breached of such duty proximately caused injury to Plaintiff.
- 86. The injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature of which the statutes were designed to protect.
- 87. Plaintiff was a member of the class of persons the statute was designed to protect.
- 88. Defendants' conduct as described herein was wrongful conduct in that the Defendant conducted their business in an abusive, oppressive, and harassing manner.
- 89. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to refrain from unlawful debt collections and wrongful repossession.
- 90. Defendants' unlawful conduct demonstrates their negligent failure to adequately train and supervise those collecting debts allegedly owed to Defendants.
- 91. Defendants' wrongful conduct as described herein actually and proximately caused the Plaintiff severe and serious physical injury and emotional distress as described above.
- 92. It was clearly foreseeable that Defendants' actions as described herein could cause severe and serious emotional distress.
- 93. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
- 94. Defendants' repossession agent showed up to Plaintiff's home to repossess this vehicle. When Plaintiff informed that he had arrangements with the creditor and did not intend to allow Defendant's agent to repossess the car, Defendant's

agent was willing and, in fact did resort to psychical contact to take the vehicle. These unlawful acts caused Plaintiff physical and emotional injury.

- 95. Defendants were aware of the probable dangerous consequences of their conduct, and willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.
- 96. Defendants acted with oppression, and/or malice, and conscious disregard of the rights of others, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount according to proof and a finder of fact at trial.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENT HIRING, SUPERVISION, RETENTION, AND TRAINING

(as to Defendant S.D.A.R., INC.)

- 97. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference all of the paragraphs above as though fully stated herein.
- 98. Defendants were negligent in the hiring, retention, training, and/or supervision of its employees and/or agents. Defendants actions and omissions constitute negligence in that they owed Plaintiff a duty to hire, retain, train, and/or supervise its employees properly, said duty was breached, and said breach was the proximate cause of damages suffered by Plaintiff.
- 99. The actions and omissions of Defendants as described herein constitute grossly negligent hiring, retention, training, and/or supervision in that they owed Plaintiff a duty to hire, retain, train, and/or supervise its employees properly, said duty was breached, said breach was the proximate cause of damages suffered by Plaintiff, and Defendants actions demonstrate a want of scant care and an indifference to the rights of Plaintiff. The actions of Defendants were willful, malicious, and wanton. The actions of Defendant were highly unreasonable and demonstrate an extreme departure from the ordinary care of a reasonably trained and supervised repossessions agent.
- 100. Plaintiff suffered damages due to Defendants actions in an amount to be determined by proof by the finder of fact at trial.

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- 101. Defendants' repossession agent showed up to Plaintiff's home to repossess this vehicle. When Plaintiff informed that he had arrangements with the creditor and did not intend to allow Defendant's agent to repossess the car, Defendant's agent was willing and, in fact did resort to psychical contact to take the vehicle. These unlawful acts caused Plaintiff physical and emotional injury.
- 102. Defendants were aware of the probable dangerous consequences of their conduct, and willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.
- 103. Despite these unlawful acts Defendants ratified the acts of their repossession agent by failing to terminate, discipline or reprimand him.
- 104. Defendants acted with oppression, and/or malice, and conscious disregard of the rights of others, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount according to proof and a finder of fact at trial.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Honorable Court grant the following relief from Defendants:

- 1. Actual damages;
- 2. Statutory damages;
- 19 3. Treble damages pursuant to Cal. Civil Code § 3345;
 - 4. Punitive damages:
 - 5. Plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees;
 - 6. Costs of the action; and
- 23 7. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated:

/s/ Andre L. Verdun Andre L. Verdun, ESQ. Attorney for Plaintiff

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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

NOW COMES Plaintiff, MARK RUBINSTEIN, by and through his attorneys, Ronald Wilcox and Andre L. Verdun, and hereby demands a trial by jury in the above-captioned matter.

Dated:

___/s/ Andre L. Verdun Andre L. Verdun, ESQ. Attorney for Plaintiff

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SJS 44 (Rev. 1207) Case 3:13-cv-00106-MMA-KSC Decument 1 Filed 01/15/13 Page 16 of 16

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS Mark Rubinstein			DEFENDANTS S.D.A.R., INC., an corporation doing business as SAN DIEGO AUTO RECOVERY, and TREVOR ARLIE PRATT			
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY) NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE LAND INVOLVED.						
Attorneys (If Known)						
				CA 92101 (619) 238-57	00	+
II. BASIS OF JURISE	OICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)		NSHIP OF P	RINCIPAL PARTIES	(Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)	
☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	■ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)	Citizen of Thi	PT	TF DEF 1 □ 1 Incorporated or Pr of Business In Thi	PTF DEF incipal Place	
☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant	☐ 4 Diversity	Citizen of And	ther State	2		
Detendant	(Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)	Citizen or Sub	of Business In Another State Citizen or Subject of a			
N/ NATURE OF CHI	on.	Foreign Co	•	5 D 5 Poleigh Nation		
IV. NATURE OF SUI	T (Place an "X" in One Box Only) TORTS	FORFEIT	URE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES	
□ 110 Insurance □ 120 Marine □ 130 Miller Act □ 140 Negotiable Instrument □ 150 Recovery of Overpayment ∞ Enforcement of Judgment □ 151 Medicare Act □ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excl. Veterans) □ 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits □ 160 Stockholders' Suits □ 190 Other Contract □ 195 Contract Product Liability □ 196 Franchise REAL PROPERTY □ 210 Land Condemnation □ 220 Foreclosure □ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment □ 240 Torts to Land □ 245 Tort Product Liability □ 290 All Other Real Property	Slander □ 368 Asbestos Persona □ 330 Federal Employers'	-	Food & Drug Related Seizure Rerty 21 USC 881 Laws Truck Regs. Regs. Regs. Relational Relation Remark Reporting Relations Mgmt. Relations Mgmt. Reporting Osure Act y Labor Act Labor Litigation Ret. Inc. y Act GRATION Initiation Application G Corpus - etainee mmigration	□ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 □ 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 PROPERTY RIGHTS □ 820 Copyrights □ 830 Patent □ 840 Trademark SOCIAL SECURITY □ 861 HIA (1395ff) □ 862 Black Lung (923) □ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) □ 864 SSID Title XVI □ 865 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS □ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) □ 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609	□ 400 State Reapportionment □ 410 Antitrust □ 430 Banks and Banking □ 450 Commerce □ 460 Deportation □ 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations □ 480 Consumer Credit □ 490 Cable/Sat TV □ 810 Selective Service □ 850 Securities/Commodities/ Exchange □ 875 Customer Challenge 12 USC 3410 □ 890 Other Statutory Actions □ 891 Agricultural Acts □ 892 Economic Stabilization Act □ 893 Environmental Matters □ 894 Energy Allocation Act □ 895 Freedom of Information Act □ 900Appeal of Fee Determination Under Equal Access to Justice □ 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes	
VI. CAUSE OF ACTI VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: VIII. RELATED CAS IF ANY	ON Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you a little 15 USC 1692 et seq	ssion without n deman Proof	anothe (specicite jurisdictions) a legal right)	al statutes unless diversity):	if demanded in complaint:	
01/15/2013	/s/ Andre L. Ve	erdun				
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY						
RECEIPT#A	MOUNT APPLYING IFP _		JUDGE	MAG. JU	DGE	